The Gulf of Tonkin: American Entry Into Vietnam War

America’s involvement in the Vietnam region has always been fraught with controversy. From the beginning through to the end, there have been questionable choices and decisions. What started with the Tonkin Gulf and the following Resolution led to some of the bloodiest fighting that the American forces have encountered. Tensions began to build in the area during the first French-Indochina war and continued to build through the civil war, culminating with the Vietnam War.

Build Up

The first French-Indochina war started after World War II and lasted until 1954. A majority of the fighting centered around the area of Tonkin Gulf in North Vietnam. While the region saw fighting during WWII with the Japanese invasions, it was during the 1950s that the Vietnamese pushed back against the French control of the region. American forces were involved as allies of the French, initially by supporting the French cause monetarily until they provided direct support.

American forces saw their involvement in the region [that included the peninsular area including Laos, Cambodia, and the Vietnams] as a way to ebb the wave of communism from the Chinese. The idea was called the Domino Theory — it was believed that a Communist win in Vietnam would lead to it sweeping the area, and it was counter to American foreign policy at the time. With the French defeat and withdrawal into southern Vietnam, as decided upon at the Geneva Conference, the country was pulled into a civil war that would last for another decade.

American involvement didn’t stop with the French pull-back but continued maintaining the support of the Southern forces — or the anti-communist forces. American military ships in the Tonkin Gulf helped support covert missions undertaken by the Southern forces mainly by doing reconnaissance. While these missions were initially successful, the forces were ultimately either captured or killed. Lt. General William Westmoreland, the commander of the American assistance in Vietnam, shifted the overall focus from covert attacks to shore bombardments with mortars, rockets, and other munitions from South Vietnam patrol ships. While that was happening, American forces were participating in recognizance missions offshore to aid in the missions. Later reports would show that the two sides were not acting in collaboration, but rather just happened to be in the same area at the same time.

Tonkin Gulf Incidents

On August 2, 1964, two American destroyers [Maddox and Turner Joy] stationed in the Tonkin Gulf, an area off the coast of northern Vietnam, had been charged with patrolling international waters from the Demilitarized Zone up north to the Chinese coast. On board, the USS Maddox was specially equipped to intercept communications and signals. Signals from three Northern Vietnam boats were intercepted and the Americans figured out the boats were heading their way. In an effort to avoid the conflict, the Maddox headed out to sea but later reversed course and ended back in the Tonkin Gulf.

When the three boats came within 10,000 yards of the USS Maddox, the destroyer opened fire with a five-shot burst. After the initial volley of shots, the lead boat launched a torpedo and moved away from the Maddox. The second boat attempted a shot at the destroyer but was hit by fire from its larger guns. When the second boat failed in its attempt, the first boat launched another torpedo and shot its 14.5mm guns. Ultimately the first boat took heavy damage from the larger guns of the Maddox. After the 22-minute skirmish, the North Vietnam boats retreated to the north while the Maddox headed south. According to reports, air support that had been scrambled before the skirmish started arrived on the scene and was able to strafe the retreating Vietnam boats, inflicting even more damage with evasive maneuvers.

On the evening of August 4^th, the Maddox again was tracking unidentified boats heading in their direction. With inclement weather in the area, the boats were unable to accurately see where the boats were coming from and spent the better part of three hours evading attacks at high speed. In the end, reports would state the two destroyers received hits from torpedoes and machine gun fire while sighting torpedo wakes and enemy cockpit lights along with numerous radar and surface contacts. The captain of the Maddox initially reported the ship was “under continuous torpedo attack” but later reported that the weather, combined with overeager sonarmen, may have confused the situation [more on that later].

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

After the incidents in the Tonkin Gulf, President Lyndon B. Johnson was informed of the events by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Armed with the accounts from the boats in the attacks, President Johnson immediately conveyed the situation as being unprovoked against American forces. He failed to mention any US Navy involvement in the region beforehand and asked the US Congress for permission to defend the US troops in the area. The resolution unanimously passed through the House of Representatives and only had two votes against it in the Senate, thus passing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964.

This resolution allowed the US forces to increase their numbers in the region to defend the already held positions. It authorized President Johnson to take any necessary steps to retaliate against the attacking forces and maintain international peace and security in Southeast Asia. Reportedly there was a sentiment within Congress that President Johnson would return to the chambers before there was any extra escalation of force by US troops. That didn’t happen.

The Johnson, and subsequently Nixon, Administration believed the passed resolution gave legal grounds for American involvement for the duration of the conflict. The initial belief was that Hanoi would falter when faced with the US bombing raids with Operation Rolling Thunder. With the Resolution in place, Johnson authorized the first of what would be many ground troop deployments to the area to fight the Viet Cong. And I believe we all have at least a minimal understanding of how that all turned out for the US.

Hindsight

Remember the statement about the overeager sonarmen onboard the Maddox? Well, declassified documents showed reports that came from aerial sources, as in Commander Stockdale from the USS Ticonderoga, who flew over the supposed August 4^th incident. He stated, “I had the best seat in the house to watch that event and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets — there were no PT boats there . . . there was nothing there but black water and American firepower.”

Curious, right? Interestingly, the Turner Joy didn’t report any torpedoes during that night either, with Stockdale chalking it up to inexperienced operators onboard the Maddox. What’s more, his report of the night of August 4^th was not included in the brief to the President. And he was not alone in his doubts.

Captain John J. Herrick, the Commander of the Destroyer Division 192, was on board the Maddox during the August 2^nd events and started to doubt the events of August 4^th, going so far as to question individuals and their memories of the night. He conveyed his doubts up his chain of command in Honolulu. The confusion swept up as far as Washington DC, but it wasn’t until 2005 when the documents were declassified that any of that come to light.

When President Johnson addressed Congress and the nation about the events, he painted it as an unprovoked attack by the Viet Cong, when in actuality, it was probably a series of misjudgments by men with little experience and an exuberance for their position. After Congress had approved the resolution, contrary information started to surface, thus beginning the distrust of the involvement and the belief that President Johnson lied for his own purposes.

The Gulf of Tonkin would be used as a cornerstone for the antiwar movement, and Johnson’s own words were proven false after a Congressional investigation into the events. Congress would eventually repeal the resolution in January of 1971, trying to cut any power President Nixon had to continue the Vietnam War. By then the damage was already done. The US wouldn’t end the war and leave the region until 1973.